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Abstract 
Using data from 1988 to 2007, we examine to what extent bilateral aid flows of an 
individual donor to a country depend on aid flows from all other bilateral and multilateral 
donors to that country.  We thereby want to assess to what extent donor coordination, 
free-riding, selectivity, and common donor motivations drive bilateral aid allocation as 
these determinants would point to different dependence structures.  Using approaches 
from spatial econometrics and controlling for endogeneity using an GMM framework, we 
find that other bilateral flows lead to a significant (but rather small) increase in aid flows 
from a particular donor.  The effects are particularly pronounced for so-called donor 
‘orphans’ who seem to be collectively shunned by bilateral aid donors.  This suggests that 
donor coordination and free-riding are quantitatively less important than common donor 
interests and selectivity.   2 
 
Introduction 
Foreign aid continues to be the most important form of capital flow to a large number of poor 
countries, particularly in Africa; for many more, it remains a significant flow, although FDI and 
debt flows have increased substantially recently.  Foreign aid is given by an increasing pool of 
donors, often allowing countries to choose from (or, as the case may be, be forced to deal with) 
hundreds of potential donors to fund their budgets, programs, and projects (World Bank, 1998); 
in fact, the number of donors has dramatically increased in past decades, with new entrants 
including several new regional development banks, new bilateral donors, global funds, large 
philanthropic foundations, and a myriad of NGOs of all sizes; as a result, there is increasingly 
less of a “cartel of good intentions” (Easterly 2002)  a highly fragmented aid landscape which is 
increasingly difficult to negotiate for both donors as well as recipients (Harford, Hadjimichael, 
and Klein, 2010). This decentralized approach to aid has then led to two fears: that aid by one 
donor may crowd out aid by another and that some recipients are “darlings” that receive the bulk 
of aid whereas “orphans” are left out in the cold. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether 
bilateral aid patterns exhibit either of these concerns. 
A second major trend in the past ten to fifteen years has been the increasing focus on aid 
effectiveness among bilateral and multilateral donors.  Spurred by much-noted studies by 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier and Dollar (2001), the intention of most bilateral and 
multilateral aid agencies has increasingly been on focusing aid efforts selectively on those 
countries most deserving and best able to use it productively.  While some find that this goal still 
remains largely elusive, at least as of 2006 (Aldasoro, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele, 2010), others 
have found that the direction of change has clearly been in the direction of selectivity (see World 
Bank, OECD-DAC).  As a consequence, the phenomenon of donor ‘darlings’ and donor 3 
 
‘orphans’ has emerged, who are, respectively, the winners and losers of this new selectivity (e.g. 
Rogersen and Steenson, 2009; Ansoms, Cassimon, and Marysee, 2007; Utz, 2009).   It is not 
clear, however, whether the emergence of darlings and orphans reflects hard-nosed selectivity 
based on presumed aid effectiveness, or possibly more donor fads, an issue that we will also to 
try to address below.   
Related to the two previous developments has been the call to better coordinate aid at the 
country level.  The 2001 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 2006 Accra Plan of 
Action call on donors to better coordinate their aid, which, among other things, would mostly 
require that donors restrict their support to fewer countries, and fewer sectors within countries. 
For example, lead donors have been appointed for particular sectors in countries that should 
coordinate the aid, and the number of actors in each sector should be reduced (OECD-DAC 
Source).  To the extent that such donor coordination actually works, one would expect to find 
crowding out, an issue we examine below.    
All of these developments take place against the backdrop of two findings on aid allocation.  
First, that (bilateral) aid is (and has long been) granted not only for economic and altruistic 
motives, but that past colonial ties, strategic alliances, and trade relationships affect aid flows 
(e.g. Alesina and Dollar, 2001; Hoeffler and Outram, 2008).
1   Thus donors appear to derive 
particular benefits from giving aid to certain countries which cannot easily be replaced by aid 
flows from other donors.  Second, there are substantial inter-temporal variations in aid flows.  
After a long decline in aid flows in the 1990s, they rose substantially in the 2000s, but large 
budget deficits in donor nations are sure to reduce aid flows substantially in coming years.  How 
donors will coordinate these reductions with each other will be an interesting question.  
                                                 
11 See also Martinez-Zarzoso et al (2009) and Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2009) on the impact of bilateral aid on exports 
from the donor country, showing the relevance of aid to promote a trade relationship.  4 
 
Despite this substantial literature, there exists remarkably little analysis on how in actual fact 
aid allocation to particular countries is affected by aid flows from other donors.  While there are 
a large set of studies examining bilateral aid allocation in general, only a study by Mascarenhas 
and Sandler (2006) which examines to what extent the total aid flows of a donor and aid flows to 
regions by a donor depend on giving by other donors, is similar in spirit to what we are doing 
here.  It finds that donors view giving by others largely as complementary which the authors 
interpret to mean that it follows common underlying motivations (which are not controlled for in 
the analysis). While the paper sets out a nice theoretical framework and provides an interesting 
analysis of direct bilateral flows and bilateral contributions to multilateral aid, there are some 
problems with the empirical analysis.  First, it stops at the regional level; second, no other 
covariates from the aid allocation literature are considered so that it is impossible to distinguish 
between common underlying drivers and pure complementarity effects of giving; third, 
endogeneity is only cursorily tackled, and all is estimated using a static model. Our study differs 
by first looking at country allocations rather than overall or regional aid flows using a spatial 
econometric framework, by examining a later time period (1988-2007), by specifying a much 
more complete model of aid allocation using insights from the literature, by using GMM 
procedures to deal with endogeneity, by also estimating a dynamic model, and by providing a 
full set of robustness tests. 
We find that there is a significant and rather robust (but relatively small) positive effect of giving 
by others on the giving by bilateral donors.  A 1% increase in aid by another donor leads to about 
0.03% increase in own aid.   The effect is particularly strong prior to 1995, is more visible in aid 
to Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, and is actually stronger for aid orphans rather than 
aid darlings.   5 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses a theoretical framework, 
section 3 presents the estimation strategy and the data, section 4 has the results, and section 5 
concludes.  
    
1.  Theoretical Framework 
In this study we focus on the dependence of bilateral aid giving on giving by others. This 
does not cover the entire spectrum of aid flows, but focuses on one aspect. There are several 
reasons for this choice. First, bilateral aid continues to be the by far the most important aid flow 
to developing countries. While multilateral development banks (such as the World Bank and 
regional development banks) also transfer substantial amounts of resources, much of that is in 
the form of loans that are granted with near-market terms and conditions and thus do not qualify 
as aid. Further, country aid allocation using the soft loan windows of these institutions (which 
does qualify as aid), as well as donor aid contributions to these soft-loan windows (such as the 
World Bank’s IDA allocation formula) are driven by allocation and contribution formulas that 
leave rather little room for donor discretion. In contrast, donors have a great deal of discretion 
over the amount and destination of their bilateral flows.
2, 3    
When examining the dependence of bilateral flows on other donor flows, it is important to 
discuss the differing motivations for bilateral aid and the implications this would have on the 
dependence of flows.   
                                                 
2 Non-governmental donors are generally too small to plausibly affect bilateral flows, although this might be 
changing currently as some of the large philanthropic funds are now drastically increasing their flows.  Interestingly, 
NGO aid does not greatly differ in the allocation procedures and in fact appears to follow the aid allocation process 
of the donor country they are located in.  See Dreher, Koch, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele (2008) for a discussion.   
3 We will, however, consider how multilateral flows to a country affect bilateral flows to the same country in our 
estimations.   6 
 
A first approach, also discussed by Mascarenhas and Sandler (2006), is to consider 
bilateral aid giving as a global public good.  If it helps to promote the Millennium Development 
Goals or raises incomes in recipient countries, all donor countries benefit as they all committed 
themselves to promoting the MDGs and higher incomes in recipient countries will promote trade, 
reduce migration flows from these countries, and generate similar desirable effects.  In such a 
setting, free-riding is clearly an issue.  In fact, such free-riding would generate suboptimal total 
aid flows.  This is well-recognized and there are several approaches to the problem: the 
multilateral organizations resort to contribution formulas to address the problem
4, and the goal-
setting of bilateral flows (aimed to reach 0.7% of GDP of donor countries as reaffirmed in the 
MDGs) is another (much less successful) attempt to circumvent the problem.  Free-riding could 
not only affect total aid flows, but also affect aid flows to particular recipient countries.  The 
more other donors give, the more one can free-ride on these contributions.  One would thus 
expect that free-riding would cause crowding out, or a negative relation of other donor flows on 
one’s own aid commitment.    
Other considerations would limit such free-riding, however. First, there are donor-
specific motivations that go beyond the provision of a global public good. Colonial ties, strategic 
and political interests, trade interests, and a donor’s domestic political economy all may affect 
the priorities of aid allocation as far as the choice of recipient countries are concerned.  To the 
extent that these motivations differ among donors, we would expect then little dependence of aid 
flows on each other.  A clear example would be colonial history where each donor will have 
different priorities based on its own history. To the extent the motivations are similar across 
                                                 
4 This is for example how the soft loan window of the World Bank, IDA, raises its funds from bilateral donors.   7 
 
donors, however, and not well captured by our covariates below, we might actually find a 
positive relationship of each other’s giving, or some crowding in.
5   
Such crowing-in could also occur as a result of the increasing selectivity focus of donors 
on countries with ‘good policies’ or those in high need.  To the extent that these factors are not 
captured in our covariates, we would expect donors to converge in their selection strategy on the 
same set of countries.  This would lead to both the phenomenon of “darlings” and “orphans” as 
well as to a crowding-in of bilateral donors.  As selectivity has become an increasing focus of 
development cooperation in recent years, we would expect a crowding-in to be particularly 
pronounced in more recent years, compared to earlier periods. While the need and effectiveness 
arguments might be important drivers for selectivity, selectivity might also be driven by a desire 
to associate one’s aid flows with positive developments in poor countries. Countries with 
successful economic policies might attract more aid to associate that success with these aid 
flows. This could strengthen a crowding-in in ‘donor darlings’, and a collective flight from 
‘donor orphans’ where difficult aid environments make aid that much harder to achieve.       
Lastly, donor coordination, if taken seriously, should affect the dependence of bilateral 
flows on each other.  This might generate different effects.  To the extent that donor coordination 
operates as a cartel, as alleged by Easterly (2002), it could lead to crowding-in, i.e. a positive 
dependence of aid flows as donors decide which recipient countries are favoured by the cartel.  
But the increasing fragmentation of aid flows should reduce this effect over time.  Moreover, 
recent effects at aid coordination, following from the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 
                                                 
5 Of course, even if donor-specific interests predominate, donors might want to partly free ride on other country’s 
flows which would counteract such crowding in.  But one might argue that free-riding is much less likely if these 
motivations dominate. For example, guilt associated with colonial history can hardly be reduced by aid flows from 
other donors; furthering bilateral trade or strategic interests will likely be jeopardized rather than helped by other 
bilateral flows (e.g. Martinez-Zarzoso et al. 2009); and even altruistic, humanitarian, or ideological motives cannot 
depend on other donor flows, particularly if the ‘warm glow’ of giving is an important aspect of this motivation.   8 
 
would suggest that donors reduce the number of recipient countries and sectors, taking due note 
of other country’s flows.  Thus one should find a negative relation between the flows of an 
individual donor and those of all others.  To the extent that a possible donor cartel has weakened 
and donor coordination has become an increasing focus of attention in the past ten years, we 
would therefore expect the relationship to become more negative over time.   
  Thus these theoretical considerations point to different plausible effects.  While the 
public good argument and the donor coordination argument point to a crowding out, or a 
negative relation between donors’ giving, the donor motivation and selectivity argument might 
generate a positive relationship.  The importance of these effects might also vary over time so 
that it becomes largely an empirical question to inquire which effects dominate for different time 
periods and regions.   
2.  Estimation Strategy and Data 
  In this section, we describe our empirical methodology and our data. 
3.1 Estimation Strategy 
  Our baseline specification estimates per-capita foreign aid from donor d to recipient r in 
year t as a function of donor characteristics Donord,t, recipient characteristics Recipientr,t, donor-
recipient variables Paird,r,t and a time trend: 
  ,, 0 1 , 2 , 3 ,, ,, drt dt rt drt t drt Aid Donor Recipient Pair Trend           (1) 
where  ,, drt   is the error term. Our control variables are drawn from the existing literature and are 
described below. We then modify this by including the aid from other donors to country r in year 
t, a variable known in the literature as the spatial lag. Specifically, we estimate: 
  ,, 0 ,, 1 , 2 , 3 ,, ,, drt irt dt rt drt t drt
id
Aid Aid Donor Recipient Pair Trend     

        (2) 9 
 
where  ,, irt
id
Aid
  is the total aid by other countries.
6 Clearly, if aid from i impacts country d and 
vice versa, the spatial lag is endogenous. To deal with this, we use GMM instrumental variables 




    and  ,, irt
id
Pair
   that is, the average of the other donor’s characteristics and the 
average of their pair-wise characteristics with the recipient in question. The intuition behind 
these variables is that for a given donor i, donor and pair variables directly impact aid by i and 
are unaffected by aid from d. Therefore they are correlated with the endogenous variable but are 
themselves exogenous, making them suitable instruments. 
  This baseline specification is modified to explore the robustness of our findings. The 
specifics of these modifications are described below. 
2.2 Data 
  Our data are a panel of 22 donors and 118 recipients that runs from 1988 to 2007. The list 
of donors and recipients are found in Table A1 of the Appendix.  
Our dependent variable Aidd,r,t is the per-capita bilateral gross Official Development 
Assistance disbursements from country d to r in t, as reported in the OECD DAC database, using 
the official DAC definition of aid (i.e. flows that have a grant component of at least 25%). It is 
measured in millions of constant 2005 US dollars.
7 Figure 1 indicates how total aid flows have 
varied over time and across regions. As can be seen, the bulk of flows go to Africa followed by 
Asia. Over time, there was a substantial decline in the real value of bilateral aid flows during the 
1990s, a trend which reversed itself during the 2000s. Figure 2 breaks down the average total 
                                                 
6 As described by Anselin (1988), one can alternatively “row standardize” the spatial lag, making it a weighted 
average of other countries’ donations. Since there is no reason to expect that ODA from one country affects aid from 
d more than that from another, we could row standardize utilizing equal weights. However, since we have a constant 
number of donors across our sample, this would simply scale up the coefficient ρ by 22, the number of donors in our 
sample. 
7 We utilized the consumer price deflator from the Economic Report to the President (2009).  10 
 
donations by donor. Japan leads the way roughly 28% of ODA. This is followed by the US, 
Germany and France, who jointly make up another 42% of flows. Note that these are only the 
bilateral ODAs and do not include what donor countries provide to multilateral assistance 
programs.
8 





d,t, which are the real value of per-capita donor GDP, its square, 
donor population, and its square. As with aid flows, GDP is measured in real 2005 millions of 
US dollars. Consistent with the existing literature which finds that larger, wealthier economies 
donate more, we generally anticipate positive coefficients for these variables. 
  For the recipient country, we similarly include per capita GDPr,t , GDP
2
r,t , Populationr,t, 
and Population
2
r,t to control for wealth and size. Following previous findings, we expect that 
more ODA goes to larger but poorer countries; in per-capita terms, we would expect, however, 
that smaller countries receive more aid/capita (e.g. Alesina and Dollar, 2001). In addition to 
recipient size, we include a several additional variables.
9 Three of these are intended to control 
for the nation’s political situation. Freedomr,t is the sum of the political liberty and civil liberty 
scores from the Freedom House Index. Politicsr,t is the difference between the democracy and 
autocracy scores from the Polity 4 Databank. Both Freedomr,t  and Politicsr,t are coded so that 
higher values mean less political freedom. Conflictr,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
nation experienced a conflict within its borders that resulted in at least 25 deaths during year t. 
Given that in nations with better institutions less ODA may be diverted due to corruption, 
increasing the benefit from aid, we expect negative coefficients on these variables. In addition, 
                                                 
8 In unreported results, we excluded the oil-rich Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and 
United Arab Emirates) and/or Israel. This did not qualitatively affect the full sample results. 
9 When we omit these additional variables but include lagged ODA and recipient dummies, we find results for the 
spatial lag that are qualitatively comparable to the reported results, although the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient is somewhat larger. 11 
 
we control for Opennessr,t measured as the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP. In order 
to control for the influence of multilateral aid flows to a recipient on its bilateral flows, we 
include Multilateralr,t-1 which is the per-capita value of the multilateral aid received by recipient 
r in year t-1.
10 
  Finally, we include several variables specific to a donor-recipient pair. Distanced,r is the 
great circle distance between the two capital cities (measured in kilometres). We expect this to be 
negatively correlated with aid as donors focus on proximate nations. In a similar vein, 
Contiguityd,r is a dummy variable equal to one if the two countries are geographically 
contiguous. Languaged,r is a dummy variable equal to one if the two nations share the same 
official language, a trait we expect to be positively correlated with aid flows. Finally, Colonyd,r is 
a dummy variable equal to one if the two countries were ever part of the same colonial empire. 
Since we expect donors to be particularly sensitive to the plight of nations with which they share 
a history, we anticipate a positive coefficient for this variable, as has been found in the literature 
(e.g. World Bank, 1998; Alesina and Dollar, 2001). 
  Finally, except as noted, we include both donor and recipient dummy variables to control 
for donor or recipient specific, time-invariant characteristics in all regressions. Excepting the 





3.1 Baseline Results 
                                                 
10 We use the lagged value to deal with potential endogeneity. When using the contemporaneous value of 
multilateral aid instead, similar results were found. 12 
 
  Table 1 presents our baseline results. Column 1 presents our baseline results of (1) 
without recipient dummies (but including donor dummies). Column (2) repeats this including 
both donor and recipient dummies; the difference should capture a range of unmeasured 
recipient-specific effects that could affect aid allocations. The coefficients suggest that more aid 
comes from larger donors both in terms of GDP per capita and population.  When not controlling 
for recipient-specific fixed effects, more ODA goes to recipients with lower GDP per capita and 
larger populations. However,  after controlling for recipient specific, time-invariant effects, we 
see that more aid goes to countries with smaller populations and GDP per capita is 
insignificant.
11 In addition, more ODA goes to recipients with better institutions  and those with 
greater multilateral aid flows; this effect becomes much smaller once recipient-specific effects 
are controlled for. Turning to the pair variables, we find that more aid occurs between donors and 
recipients that are proximate, share a common official language, and have a common colonial tie. 
The qualitative nature of these estimates mirror those found elsewhere in the literature (e..g 
Alesina and Dollar, 2001; Hoeffler and Outram, 2008).  
  In column 3, we introduce the spatial lag to the specification of column 1 without 
recipient fixed effects. This results in two major changes. First, the estimated impact of 
multilateral aid switches from positive to negative suggesting that the coefficient in column (1) 
was capturing both the impact of multilateral aid and that of the bilateral aid of others. Second, 
and of specific interest for our analysis, we find a significantly positive spatial lag. The estimated 
coefficient indicates that a 1% increase in ODA by country i would is associated with a .13% 
increase in ODA by country d.
12 Column 4 reintroduces the recipient effects. This results in 
insignificance of the recipient variables which are now all captured by the fixed effects. In 
                                                 
11 At the sample mean, the net marginal effect of population is negative. 
12 Note that the spatial lag is the sum of logs, not the log of sums. A 1% increase in the donations of all other donors 
would result in an increase of aid from d of 21 times the estimated coefficient. 13 
 
particular, multilateral aid is now insignificant. Further, the point estimate on the spatial lag is 
cut by two-thirds, suggesting that a 1% increase in another nation’s ODA would increase that of 
d by .049%.  
  Finally, column 5 introduces the lag of aid by donor d to recipient r.
13 As can be seen, 
this increases our R
2, which is not surprising given the persistence in donations. It is worth 
noting that we can reject the hypothesis that there is a unit root in aid.
14 Inclusion of this variable 
reduces the point estimate of the spatial lag further still implying that a 1% increase in the aid by 
another country only increases that in i by .036%. An alternative interpretation is that if all of the 
other 21 donors increased their donations by 1%, the country in question would raise their 
donations by just over .75%. Given the added explanatory power of the time lag of ODA, we 
utilize this preferred specification in the remainder of the paper.
15  
  Taken as a whole, these estimates reject crowding-out. If anything, they suggest a slight 
crowding-in effect, although one that is economically small. This suggests that, overall, the 
selectivity, joint interest, or cartel issues are more relevant empirically than free-riding in the 
provision of a global public good or true donor coordination following the Paris Declaration.   
3.2 Robustness Checks 
  In Table 2, we approach two aspects of the time dimension of our data. In column 1, we 
replace the time trend with year dummies. In spatial econometrics, this often results in 
insignificant spatial lags. This is due to the fact that, when moving between the observations for, 
say donations from Germany and France to Ghana within a year, the spatial lag differs only by 
                                                 
13 Note that when we use lagged values, we are taking them to be exogenous. In practice, depending on the timing of 
ODA disbursements, donations by d in December of t-1 may be reacting to what is dispersed by other nations in 
January of t. Unfortunately, the annual nature of our data do not allow us to investigate such issues. In unreported 
results, we used constructed values of lagged variables based off of column 2 of Table 1. This resulted in 
qualitatively similar results to those reported. These alternate specifications are available on request. 
14 The χ
2 value for this test was 1285.95. 
15 In any case, the results when excluding this variable were generally very comparable to those presented, although 
the point estimate on the spatial lag tended to be somewhat higher. 14 
 
the difference in the individual aid levels. As a result, the spatial lag does not vary much across 
donors within a year. With this in mind, it is of little surprise that the estimated coefficient falls. 
Nevertheless, it remains significantly positive and again argues against crowding-out. 
  Columns 2 and 3 split our sample into two halves, one early and one late. One major 
reason to do this is that starting in the mid-1990s, there was a movement towards greater 
selectivity as well as greater coordination of aid (e.g. World Bank, 1998; Collier and Dollar, 
2001); the former would suggest a rising positive dependence, the latter a rising negative 
dependence. In each, we find significantly positive spatial lags, although the late one has a 
somewhat smaller point estimate. This is consistent with the hypothesis that a donor cartel has 
weakened, and donor coordination has increased more than selectivity; but the changes are small 
and only suggest that crowing-out (or very high levels of donor coordination) continue to be 
absent.   
  Table 3 separates our data into five regions according to the World Bank classification 
system.
16 Across regions, the control variables are generally similar in terms of sign and 
significance to the preferred specifications results. Focussing on the spatial lag, excepting the 
Americas, we find a positive point estimate in each case. However, this is only significant for  
Africa  and the Mideast. Thus, to the extent that crowding-in occurs, the data indicates that it 
tends to happen most often in those regions. Furthermore, in no region do we find evidence 
indicating crowding-out in bilateral aid. For Africa, however, note that we find a significantly 
negative effect on multilateral aid. This suggests that multilateral assistance to those nations may 
be replacing bilateral aid. 
                                                 
16 Details on which countries are in which category can be found in Table A1 of the appendix. 15 
 




17  We 
do this to investigate whether there is evidence of crowding out over time. In particular, if ODA 
from the rest of the world were unexpectedly large in year t-1, one might be concerned that a 
given country would revise its ODA in year t downwards.  Column 1 repeats the preferred 
specification for comparison. Column 2 adds  ,, 1 irt
id
Aid 





18 As can be seen, the past values of ODA by other countries are significantly and 
negatively correlated with ODA in the current year. This does suggest some downward revision 
by country d in response to past increases by other nations. Nevertheless, the net effect from 
adding the coefficients on the spatial lag are essentially the same as that from the preferred 
specification and in each case we can firmly reject the null hypothesis that the net effect is less 
than or equal to zero.
19 Thus, even if there is some downward revision, the net effect continues to 
indicate that a 1% rise in the donations by another country increases the donations by the country 
in question by around .02%, indicating that there is no net crowding-out. 
  Finally, Table 5 attempts to examine whether there is a difference between nations that 
tend to receive higher ODA (darlings) and those that tend to receive smaller ODA (orphans). To 
categorize countries, we took the estimates from Table 1, column 1 and calculated residuals. 
Countries where the mean residual was positive were then classified as darlings while those with 
negative mean residuals were classified as orphans.
20 Table A1 of the appendix indicates which 
                                                 
17 As with Aidd,r,t-1 we take these as exogenous in year t. In unreported results using constructed versions of these, 
similar results were found. 
18 In unreported results, we extended the time lags of the spatial lag back to t-5. These were not significant and did 
not overly effect the estimates of the reported time lags. 
19 The χ
2 for column 2 was 85.90 while that for column 3 was 3.45.  
20 In unreported results, we classified darlings as those in the top quartile of mean residuals and orphans as those in 
the lowest quartile. Qualitatively similar results were found. A second check on our approach utilized column 2 of 
Table 1 (i.e. also using recipient fixed effects) to construct residuals. A third utilized only the recipient’s GDP per 16 
 
nations fell into which categories. Column 1 uses only the orphan countries. As can be seen, the 
results are largely similar to the preferred specification’s pooled results. Column 2 uses only the 
darlings. We find a significant impact of the spatial lag only for the orphans, where the estimated 
coefficient is comparable to that in the pooled regressions. Thus, once again, we find no evidence 
of crowding out, even among those countries that tend to receive smaller ODAs that the data 
would predict.  Conversely, it seems more that specifically among orphans, the selectivity has 
some bite, leading donors to collectively abandon them.   
  In addition to these reported robustness checks, we investigated other splits of the data 
such as using only the top five donor countries, only European donors, only non-OECD 
recipients, only recipients with on less greater than the sample mean total ODA per capita, and 
only recipients with on average greater than the sample mean ODA per capita. In all but the last 
of these alternative sub-samples, we found significantly positive spatial lags with coefficients of 
around .03. In the last of these using only above average recipients, comparable to the darlings 
result in Table 5, we found and insignificant spatial lag. In no case did we find a significantly 
negative spatial lag, again arguing against evidence of crowding out. These additional robustness 
checks are available on request. 
 
4. Conclusion 
  The goal of this paper has been to investigate whether there is evidence of crowding-out 
or crowding-in in bilateral ODA flows. There are several arguments that point to both effects and 
their respective strength is an empirical question.  Using panel data from 22 donors to 118 
recipients over a twenty year period, we find no evidence of crowding-out, that is that increased 
                                                                                                                                                             
capita and population when predicting aid whereas a fourth simply took those with above and below average ODA 
per capita to define the darlings and orphans. In each case, we found qualitatively similar results. 17 
 
donations by other countries to a given recipient tends to lower donations by a given donor to 
that recipient. Instead, we find evidence for crowding in, with a 1% increase in the ODA by 
another country being associated with approximately a .03% increase in ODA by the country in 
question. While this result is of minor economic significance, it suggests that selectivity and/or 
donor cartels based on joint interests are more important factors in aid allocation than donor 
coordination or free-riding.  The falling positive association over time suggests a declining role 
of cartels and a rising role of aid coordination.  For aid orphans, the dependence of aid flows is 
particularly strong, making their problem particularly severe.   
  It should be noted that even though we find no evidence of crowding out, this does not 
imply that aid levels are optimal either from the perspective of the globe or from that of the 
donor countries as a whole.  While we find little evidence of free-riding at the country level, it 
may still play a role as far as total aid flows are concerned.  Thus current efforts and mechanisms 
to reduce free-riding (such as the step plan of the EU to increase aid flows) remain relevant.   
  These are rather preliminary results and there is a range of ways one can extent the 
analysis.  For example, it is useful to more carefully model the interaction between multilateral 
and bi-lateral giving more carefully, including the role of leads and lags in that respect.  
Similarly, one might want to include giving by other entities (including non-DAC countries, 
global funds, large foundations and NGOs) which plays an increasing role in the last 10 years.  
Lastly, one might want to investigate whether indeed the response of bilateral donors to giving 
by other bilateral depends on who those other bi-laterals are.     
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Rest of World20 
 
Table 1: Baseline Results 
 




       0.128***  0.049***  0.036*** 
     (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.007) 
Donor Variables 
GDPd,t  6.645*** 6.555*** 7.236*** 6.927***  0.797 
  (1.120) (1.003) (1.284) (1.008)  (0.671) 
GDP
2
d,t  0.414*** 0.416*** 0.427*** 0.421***  -0.024 
  (0.098) (0.089) (0.114) (0.090)  (0.059) 
Populationd,t  -6.285 -6.610 -7.075 -8.531  -1.717 
  (6.837) (6.308) (7.931) (6.339)  (3.682) 
Population
2
d,t  0.447** 0.476** 0.534**  0.541*** 0.111 
  (0.201) (0.187) (0.234) (0.190)  (0.103) 
Recipient Variables 
GDPr,t  -0.434*** -0.378 0.511*** -0.024  -0.116 
  (0.069) (0.335) (0.091) (0.438)  (0.227) 
GDP
2
r,t  -0.011*** -0.027 0.013*** -0.001  0.001 
  (0.004) (0.019) (0.005) (0.027)  (0.018) 
Populationr,t  2.188*** -12.183*** -4.342***  -0.384  5.399 
  (0.196) (1.410) (0.349) (4.824)  (5.444) 
Population
2
r,t  -0.039*** 0.353*** 0.085***  0.011  -0.141 
  (0.006) (0.042) (0.009) (0.125)  (0.145) 
Freedomr,t  -0.076*** -0.003 0.128***  0.003  -0.018* 
  (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.009) 
Politicsr,t  0.026*** 0.014**  0.011*  0.002  -0.007 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.008) 
Conflictr,t  -0.003 -0.053  -0.341***  -0.001 0.045 
  (0.037) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046)  (0.052) 
Opennessr,t  0.322*** 0.070 -0.533*** 0.000  0.001 
  (0.028) (0.068) (0.048) (0.071)  (0.061) 
Multilateralr,t-1  0.529*** 0.199*** -1.073***  0.001  -0.145 
  (0.016) (0.022) (0.064) (0.050)  (0.095) 
Pair Variables 
Distanced,r  -0.634*** -1.832*** -1.490*** -1.920***  -0.556*** 
  (0.030) (0.038) (0.049) (0.059)  (0.090) 
Contiguityd,r  1.025*  -0.131 0.190 -0.140  0.063 
  (0.538) (0.493) (0.513) (0.569)  (0.230) 
Languaged,r  1.562*** 1.882*** 1.896*** 1.974***  0.537*** 
  (0.044) (0.042) (0.058) (0.066)  (0.033) 
Colonyd,r  1.963*** 1.677*** 1.997*** 1.759***  0.469*** 
  (0.067) (0.062) (0.095) (0.068)  (0.040) 
Aidd,r,t-1       0.750*** 
       (0.005) 21 
 
Trendt  -0.083*** -0.038*** -0.083*** -0.080*** -0.060** 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.021)  (0.027) 
Constant  161.610*** 209.846*** 189.227*** 171.936***  71.642** 
  (57.719) (54.417) (66.346) (54.427)  (32.549) 
          
Recipient 
Dummies? 
No Yes No Yes  Yes 
Observations 34587  34587  34587  34587  33936 
R-squared 0.598  0.677 0.428 0.663  0.854
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All specifications include donor dummies. 22 
 
Table 2: Time 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 




    0.023*** 0.034* 0.021*** 
  (0.002) (0.020) (0.008) 
Donor Variables 
GDPd,t  0.480 4.271 1.697 
  (27.632) (3.477)  (1.069) 
GDP
2
d,t  0.047 0.134 0.017 
  (2.656) (0.308) (0.094) 
Populationd,t  -3.770 111.308  -18.392*** 
  (260.876) (77.612)  (6.184) 
Population
2
d,t  0.209 -3.308***  0.660*** 
  (23.537) (1.134)  (0.184) 
Recipient Variables 
GDPr,t  -0.397** 1.650  -0.134 
  (0.192) (44.639) (0.645) 
GDP
2
r,t  -0.009 0.087 0.000 
  (0.010) (1.930) (0.061) 
Populationr,t  1.037 9.741 2.908 
  (1.117) (14.093)  (20.590) 
Population
2
r,t  -0.042 -0.227 -0.069 
  (0.035) (3.943) (0.687) 
Freedomr,t  -0.015 0.034 -0.024 
  (0.009) (0.545) (0.018) 
Politicsr,t  0.001 0.020 -0.003 
  (0.005) (0.047) (0.027) 
Conflictr,t  0.022 0.040 -0.013 
  (0.031) (0.607) (0.049) 
Opennessr,t  -0.013 0.152 -0.034 
  (0.045) (6.654) (0.088) 
Multilateralr,t-1  -0.116*** -0.159  -0.036 
  (0.019) (1.022) (0.070) 
Pair Variables 
Distanced,r  -0.523*** -0.580 -0.536*** 
  (0.026) (3.934) (0.065) 
Contiguityd,r  0.055 -1.056  0.580** 
 (0.226)  (26.298)  (0.259) 
Languaged,r  0.510*** 0.606 0.486*** 
  (0.030) (1.303) (0.098) 
Colonyd,r  0.438*** 0.408 0.464*** 
  (0.037) (4.520) (0.080) 
Aidd,r,t-1  0.750*** 0.752*** 0.748*** 23 
 
  (0.018) (0.014) (0.007) 
Trendt   -0.135  -0.054 
   (1.084)  (0.036) 
Constant  -19.137 -726.136***  221.803*** 
 (34.343)  (160.340)  (55.589) 
      
Observations 33936  10815  23121 
R-squared 0.859  0.868  0.856 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All specifications include donor and recipient dummies. 24 
 
Table 3: Regions 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 




    0.034*** 0.009  -0.005  0.044*** 0.009 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.006) 
Donor Variables        
GDPd,t  0.559 0.821 2.187 0.829  9.503*** 
  (0.986) (1.374) (1.468) (2.475)  (3.219) 
GDP
2
d,t  -0.066 0.007 0.156 0.074  0.827*** 
  (0.088) (0.122) (0.130) (0.217)  (0.281) 
Populationd,t  -1.073 -11.541 7.304 -14.734  -37.157* 
  (5.325) (7.891) (8.169)  (13.699)  (21.758) 
Population
2
d,t  0.105 0.470** -0.080  0.545 1.143* 
  (0.149) (0.234) (0.239) (0.396)  (0.678) 
Recipient Variables 
GDPr,t  0.497 -0.269 0.758 2.122 -1.470 
  (0.585) (1.100) (0.778) (1.487)  (1.864) 
GDP
2
r,t  0.018 -0.007 0.070  0.281**  -0.069 
  (0.032) (0.052) (0.060) (0.143)  (0.127) 
Populationr,t  8.372** -1.460 -10.371 8.108 -13.943 
  (3.816) (3.903) (7.581) (5.689)  (19.012) 
Population
2
r,t  -0.264** 0.024  0.369  -0.308  0.362 
  (0.120) (0.116) (0.275) (0.189)  (0.650) 
Freedomr,t  -0.002 -0.043** 0.017  0.026  -0.028 
  (0.016) (0.021) (0.029) (0.042)  (0.092) 
Politicsr,t  0.003 -0.011 0.018 0.012 -0.005 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.026) 
Conflictr,t  -0.052 0.095 -0.058 0.111 0.147 
  (0.043) (0.059) (0.087) (0.143)  (0.207) 
Opennessr,t  0.046 0.022 -0.060  -0.651*  -0.193 
 (0.059)  (0.125)  (0.121)  (0.395)  (0.296) 
Multilateralr,t-1  -0.126*** -0.064  0.005  -0.014  -0.125 
 (0.044)  (0.073)  (0.031)  (0.026)  (0.147) 
Pair Variables 
Distanced,r  -0.613*** -0.555*** -0.522*** -0.926*** -0.901*** 
 (0.051)  (0.095)  (0.118)  (0.257)  (0.201) 
Contiguityd,r     0.020    -0.540 
     (0.206)    (0.493) 
Languaged,r  0.560*** 0.077 0.695***  0.374**   
  (0.043) (0.078) (0.106) (0.169)   
Colonyd,r  0.603*** 0.394***  0.205*  0.054  -0.829 
  (0.057) (0.100) (0.107) (0.302)  (0.513) 
Aidd,r,t-1  0.734*** 0.758*** 0.700*** 0.764*** 0.530*** 25 
 
  (0.008) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019)  (0.025) 
Trendt  -0.042*** -0.029  -0.061**  0.012  0.059 
  (0.012) (0.021) (0.025) (0.038)  (0.037) 
Constant  20.031 133.745*  112.470 40.840 322.194 
 (50.692)  (79.975)  (111.755)  (134.616)  (204.467) 
        
Observations 16191  5460  7140  2667  2478 
R-squared  0.850 0.892 0.873 0.873  0.  785 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All specifications include donor and recipient dummies. 
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Table 4: Time Lags 
 




    0.036*** 0.074*** 0.046*** 




     -0.052***  -0.030*** 




       -0.007*** 
     (0.001) 
Donor Variables 
GDPd,t  0.797 0.451 0.302 
  (0.671) (0.682) (0.666) 
GDP
2
d,t  -0.024 -0.032 -0.044 
  (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) 
Populationd,t  -1.717 0.745 0.483 
  (3.682) (3.718) (3.589) 
Population
2
d,t  0.111 0.032 0.039 
  (0.103) (0.104) (0.101) 
Recipient Variables 
GDPr,t  -0.116 0.245 0.032 
  (0.227) (0.199) (0.232) 
GDP
2
r,t  0.001 0.014 -0.000 
  (0.018) (0.011) (0.013) 
Populationr,t  5.399 2.398** -0.363 
  (5.444) (1.173) (1.694) 
Population
2
r,t  -0.141 -0.073** 0.008 
  (0.145) (0.036) (0.053) 
Freedomr,t  -0.018* 0.006  0.003 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Politicsr,t  -0.007 -0.002 0.002 
  (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Conflictr,t  0.045 0.003 -0.005 
  (0.052) (0.031) (0.031) 
Opennessr,t  0.001 -0.019 0.001 
 (0.061)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
Multilateralr,t-1  -0.145 -0.018 0.013 
 (0.095)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
Pair Variables 
Distanced,r  -0.556*** -0.507*** -0.499*** 
 (0.090)  (0.026)  (0.025) 
Contiguityd,r  0.063 0.047 0.031 
 (0.230)  (0.249)  (0.234) 27 
 
Languaged,r  0.537*** 0.487*** 0.470*** 
  (0.033) (0.031) (0.030) 
Colonyd,r  0.469*** 0.422*** 0.414*** 
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.038) 
Aidd,r,t-1  0.750*** 0.761*** 0.757*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Trendt  -0.060** -0.027***  -0.020*** 
  (0.027) (0.005) (0.007) 
Constant  71.642** 21.016  32.660 
  (32.549) (33.027) (33.003) 
      
Observations  33936 33936 33285 
R-squared  0.854 0.849 0.859 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All specifications include donor and recipient dummies. 
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Table 5: Darlings and Orphans 
 
 (1)  (2) 




    0.041*** -0.007 
 (0.014)  (0.009) 
Donor Variables 
GDPd,t  1.620 0.420 
  (1.094) (0.831) 
GDP
2
d,t  0.065 -0.028 
  (0.098) (0.072) 
Populationd,t  -10.208* 4.389 
  (5.879) (4.805) 
Population
2
d,t  0.416** -0.082 
  (0.172) (0.135) 
Recipient Variables 
GDPr,t  -0.340 -0.850** 
  (0.310) (0.344) 
GDP
2
r,t  -0.014 -0.043** 
  (0.017) (0.019) 
Populationr,t  7.302* -4.357** 
  (3.969) (2.128) 
Population
2
r,t  -0.212* 0.125** 
  (0.127) (0.058) 
Freedomr,t  -0.011 -0.013 
  (0.015) (0.013) 
Politicsr,t  -0.000 0.008 
  (0.006) (0.008) 
Conflictr,t  -0.049 0.057 
  (0.051) (0.040) 
Opennessr,t  0.032 0.223*** 
 (0.080)  (0.079) 
Multilateralr,t-1  -0.116*** 0.043 
 (0.043)  (0.052) 
Pair Variables 
Distanced,r  -0.604*** -0.457*** 
 (0.046)  (0.039) 
Contiguityd,r  -0.488** 0.717 
 (0.244)  (0.516) 
Languaged,r  0.709*** 0.348*** 
  (0.054) (0.045) 
Colonyd,r  0.448*** 0.398*** 
  (0.066) (0.051) 
Aidd,r,t-1  0.715*** 0.768*** 29 
 
  (0.008) (0.008) 
Trendt  -0.053*** -0.019 
  (0.013) (0.013) 
Constant  99.927* 26.778 
 (55.336)  (42.653) 
    
Observations 16149  17787 
R-squared 0.835  0.872 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table A1: List of Countries in the Sample 
 
Donor Countries 
Australia France  Netherlands  Switzerland 
Austria  Germany  New Zealand  United Kingdom 
Belgium Greece  Norway  USA 
Canada Ireland Portugal   
Denmark Italy  Spain  
Finland Japan  Sweden   
Recipient Countries 
Algeria 





e  Croatia 




a  Djibouti 









e  Egypt 
a  Liberia 
a Saudi Arabia 
c 
Azerbaijan 





c  Eritrea 
a  Madagascar 
a Sierra Leone 
a 
Bangladesh 
b  Ethiopia 
a  Malawi 
a South Africa 
a 
Belarus 
e  Fiji 
b  Malaysia 
b Sri Lanka 
b 
Benin 
a  Gabon 




b  Gambia 




d  Georgia 




a  Ghana 









a  Guinea 




a  Guinea-Bissau 
a Morocco 
a Trinidad and Tobago 
d
Cambodia 
b  Guyana 




a  Haiti 
d  Myanmar 
a Turkey 
e 
Central African Rep. 
a  Honduras 




a  India 
b  Nepal 
b United Arab Emirates 
c
Chile 
d  Indonesia 




b  Iran 




d  Israel 




a  Jamaica 
d  Oman 
c Yemen 
c 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
a  Jordan 








d  Kenya 






e Europe. Boldface recipients are darlings, non-bold 




Table A2: Summary Statistics 




    38577 -1.420337  4.051457  -6.968033  9.250069 
GDPd,t  38577 -6.472016  1.214143  -8.992874  -4.524399 
GDP
2
d,t  38577 43.3611  16.31987  20.47019  80.87179 
Populationd,t  38577  16.69646 1.223539 15.02447 19.52358 
Population
2
d,t  38577  280.2689 41.69704 225.7347 381.1703 
GDPr,t  38577 -7.683194  2.406324  -13.85938  -1.467863 
GDP
2
r,t  38577  64.82173 35.93501 2.154621 192.0824 
Populationr,t  38577  15.68813 1.919009 11.13965 20.99407 
Population
2
r,t  38577  249.7998 59.92893 124.0918 440.7511 
Freedomr,t  38577  8.218487 3.397718 2  14 
Politicsr,t  38577  .9726804 6.662391 -10  10 
Conflictr,t  38577  .1550604 .3619662 0  1 
Distanced,r  38577  8.834431 .5776767 5.600936 9.84973 
Contiguityd,r  38577  .0013264 .0363965 0  1 
Languaged,r  38577  .1390326 .3459844 0  1 
Colonyd,r  38577  .0429102 .2026569 0  1 
Opennessr,t  38577 4.20463  .5940247  -1.175052  5.636078 
Multilateralr,t-1  38577 -11.90666  1.508448  -17.74102  -8.447645 
 
 